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authorH.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>2023-12-29 08:43:51 -0800
committerH.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>2024-01-01 05:22:48 -0800
commit541641a3de8d89464151bd879552755e882c832e (patch)
treede7e804e55c533f2081c907b04e9d2b7b7c76ca1 /sysdeps/powerpc
parent8d9f9c44605d1b4e3152bdd3f8f0daebd790380f (diff)
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x86/cet: Enable shadow stack during startup
Previously, CET was enabled by kernel before passing control to user
space and the startup code must disable CET if applications or shared
libraries aren't CET enabled.  Since the current kernel only supports
shadow stack and won't enable shadow stack before passing control to
user space, we need to enable shadow stack during startup if the
application and all shared library are shadow stack enabled.  There
is no need to disable shadow stack at startup.  Shadow stack can only
be enabled in a function which will never return.  Otherwise, shadow
stack will underflow at the function return.

1. GL(dl_x86_feature_1) is set to the CET features which are supported
by the processor and are not disabled by the tunable.  Only non-zero
features in GL(dl_x86_feature_1) should be enabled.  After enabling
shadow stack with ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS is used to check
if shadow stack is really enabled.
2. Use ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE in RTLD_START in dynamic executable.  It is
safe since RTLD_START never returns.
3. Call arch_prctl (ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE) from ARCH_SETUP_TLS in static
executable.  Since the start function using ARCH_SETUP_TLS never returns,
it is safe to enable shadow stack in ARCH_SETUP_TLS.
Diffstat (limited to 'sysdeps/powerpc')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions