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authorAdhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>2022-07-21 10:04:59 -0300
committerAdhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>2022-07-22 11:58:27 -0300
commit6f4e0fcfa2d2b0915816a3a3a1d48b4763a7dee2 (patch)
tree6b1a61c1ccc7e265998db647729411dcb8826901 /stdlib/arc4random.c
parent6c4ed247bf5aee6416c8c81a394cf692e068a579 (diff)
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stdlib: Add arc4random, arc4random_buf, and arc4random_uniform (BZ #4417)
The implementation is based on scalar Chacha20 with per-thread cache.
It uses getrandom or /dev/urandom as fallback to get the initial entropy,
and reseeds the internal state on every 16MB of consumed buffer.

To improve performance and lower memory consumption the per-thread cache
is allocated lazily on first arc4random functions call, and if the
memory allocation fails getentropy or /dev/urandom is used as fallback.
The cache is also cleared on thread exit iff it was initialized (so if
arc4random is not called it is not touched).

Although it is lock-free, arc4random is still not async-signal-safe
(the per thread state is not updated atomically).

The ChaCha20 implementation is based on RFC8439 [1], omitting the final
XOR of the keystream with the plaintext because the plaintext is a
stream of zeros.  This strategy is similar to what OpenBSD arc4random
does.

The arc4random_uniform is based on previous work by Florian Weimer,
where the algorithm is based on Jérémie Lumbroso paper Optimal Discrete
Uniform Generation from Coin Flips, and Applications (2013) [2], who
credits Donald E. Knuth and Andrew C. Yao, The complexity of nonuniform
random number generation (1976), for solving the general case.

The main advantage of this method is the that the unit of randomness is not
the uniform random variable (uint32_t), but a random bit.  It optimizes the
internal buffer sampling by initially consuming a 32-bit random variable
and then sampling byte per byte.  Depending of the upper bound requested,
it might lead to better CPU utilization.

Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu, aarch64-linux, and powerpc64le-linux-gnu.

Co-authored-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.1916.pdf
Diffstat (limited to 'stdlib/arc4random.c')
-rw-r--r--stdlib/arc4random.c208
1 files changed, 208 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/stdlib/arc4random.c b/stdlib/arc4random.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..65547e79aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stdlib/arc4random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/* Pseudo Random Number Generator based on ChaCha20.
+   Copyright (C) 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+   This file is part of the GNU C Library.
+
+   The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+   modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+   License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+   version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+   The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+   Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+   License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
+   <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
+
+#include <arc4random.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <not-cancel.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#include <tls-internal.h>
+
+/* arc4random keeps two counters: 'have' is the current valid bytes not yet
+   consumed in 'buf' while 'count' is the maximum number of bytes until a
+   reseed.
+
+   Both the initial seed and reseed try to obtain entropy from the kernel
+   and abort the process if none could be obtained.
+
+   The state 'buf' improves the usage of the cipher calls, allowing to call
+   optimized implementations (if the architecture provides it) and minimize
+   function call overhead.  */
+
+#include <chacha20.c>
+
+/* Called from the fork function to reset the state.  */
+void
+__arc4random_fork_subprocess (void)
+{
+  struct arc4random_state_t *state = __glibc_tls_internal ()->rand_state;
+  if (state != NULL)
+    {
+      explicit_bzero (state, sizeof (*state));
+      /* Force key init.  */
+      state->count = -1;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Return the current thread random state or try to create one if there is
+   none available.  In the case malloc can not allocate a state, arc4random
+   will try to get entropy with arc4random_getentropy.  */
+static struct arc4random_state_t *
+arc4random_get_state (void)
+{
+  struct arc4random_state_t *state = __glibc_tls_internal ()->rand_state;
+  if (state == NULL)
+    {
+      state = malloc (sizeof (struct arc4random_state_t));
+      if (state != NULL)
+	{
+	  /* Force key initialization on first call.  */
+	  state->count = -1;
+	  __glibc_tls_internal ()->rand_state = state;
+	}
+    }
+  return state;
+}
+
+static void
+arc4random_getrandom_failure (void)
+{
+  __libc_fatal ("Fatal glibc error: cannot get entropy for arc4random\n");
+}
+
+static void
+arc4random_rekey (struct arc4random_state_t *state, uint8_t *rnd, size_t rndlen)
+{
+  chacha20_crypt (state->ctx, state->buf, state->buf, sizeof state->buf);
+
+  /* Mix optional user provided data.  */
+  if (rnd != NULL)
+    {
+      size_t m = MIN (rndlen, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE + CHACHA20_IV_SIZE);
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < m; i++)
+	state->buf[i] ^= rnd[i];
+    }
+
+  /* Immediately reinit for backtracking resistance.  */
+  chacha20_init (state->ctx, state->buf, state->buf + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+  explicit_bzero (state->buf, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE + CHACHA20_IV_SIZE);
+  state->have = sizeof (state->buf) - (CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE + CHACHA20_IV_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void
+arc4random_getentropy (void *rnd, size_t len)
+{
+  if (__getrandom_nocancel (rnd, len, GRND_NONBLOCK) == len)
+    return;
+
+  int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (__open64_nocancel ("/dev/urandom",
+						  O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC));
+  if (fd != -1)
+    {
+      uint8_t *p = rnd;
+      uint8_t *end = p + len;
+      do
+	{
+	  ssize_t ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (__read_nocancel (fd, p, end - p));
+	  if (ret <= 0)
+	    arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
+	  p += ret;
+	}
+      while (p < end);
+
+      if (__close_nocancel (fd) == 0)
+	return;
+    }
+  arc4random_getrandom_failure ();
+}
+
+/* Check if the thread context STATE should be reseed with kernel entropy
+   depending of requested LEN bytes.  If there is less than requested,
+   the state is either initialized or reseeded, otherwise the internal
+   counter subtract the requested length.  */
+static void
+arc4random_check_stir (struct arc4random_state_t *state, size_t len)
+{
+  if (state->count <= len || state->count == -1)
+    {
+      uint8_t rnd[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE + CHACHA20_IV_SIZE];
+      arc4random_getentropy (rnd, sizeof rnd);
+
+      if (state->count == -1)
+	chacha20_init (state->ctx, rnd, rnd + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+      else
+	arc4random_rekey (state, rnd, sizeof rnd);
+
+      explicit_bzero (rnd, sizeof rnd);
+
+      /* Invalidate the buf.  */
+      state->have = 0;
+      memset (state->buf, 0, sizeof state->buf);
+      state->count = CHACHA20_RESEED_SIZE;
+    }
+  else
+    state->count -= len;
+}
+
+void
+__arc4random_buf (void *buffer, size_t len)
+{
+  struct arc4random_state_t *state = arc4random_get_state ();
+  if (__glibc_unlikely (state == NULL))
+    {
+      arc4random_getentropy (buffer, len);
+      return;
+    }
+
+  arc4random_check_stir (state, len);
+  while (len > 0)
+    {
+      if (state->have > 0)
+	{
+	  size_t m = MIN (len, state->have);
+	  uint8_t *ks = state->buf + sizeof (state->buf) - state->have;
+	  memcpy (buffer, ks, m);
+	  explicit_bzero (ks, m);
+	  buffer += m;
+	  len -= m;
+	  state->have -= m;
+	}
+      if (state->have == 0)
+	arc4random_rekey (state, NULL, 0);
+    }
+}
+libc_hidden_def (__arc4random_buf)
+weak_alias (__arc4random_buf, arc4random_buf)
+
+uint32_t
+__arc4random (void)
+{
+  uint32_t r;
+
+  struct arc4random_state_t *state = arc4random_get_state ();
+  if (__glibc_unlikely (state == NULL))
+    {
+      arc4random_getentropy (&r, sizeof (uint32_t));
+      return r;
+    }
+
+  arc4random_check_stir (state, sizeof (uint32_t));
+  if (state->have < sizeof (uint32_t))
+    arc4random_rekey (state, NULL, 0);
+  uint8_t *ks = state->buf + sizeof (state->buf) - state->have;
+  memcpy (&r, ks, sizeof (uint32_t));
+  memset (ks, 0, sizeof (uint32_t));
+  state->have -= sizeof (uint32_t);
+
+  return r;
+}
+libc_hidden_def (__arc4random)
+weak_alias (__arc4random, arc4random)