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author | Noah Goldstein <goldstein.w.n@gmail.com> | 2022-12-14 10:52:10 -0800 |
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committer | Noah Goldstein <goldstein.w.n@gmail.com> | 2022-12-15 09:09:35 -0800 |
commit | b712be52645282c706a5faa038242504feb06db5 (patch) | |
tree | 5e795cfbe0c656272225fef8781f046e32a87ebb /sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-sysconf-iov_max.c | |
parent | 6fd504849de404aad59df5b198d3751b373a0154 (diff) | |
download | glibc-b712be52645282c706a5faa038242504feb06db5.tar.gz glibc-b712be52645282c706a5faa038242504feb06db5.tar.xz glibc-b712be52645282c706a5faa038242504feb06db5.zip |
x86: Prevent SIGSEGV in memcmp-sse2 when data is concurrently modified [BZ #29863]
In the case of INCORRECT usage of `memcmp(a, b, N)` where `a` and `b` are concurrently modified as `memcmp` runs, there can be a SIGSEGV in `L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0)` because the sequential logic assumes that `(rdx - 32 + rax)` is a positive 32-bit integer. To be clear, this change does not mean the usage of `memcmp` is supported. The program behaviour is undefined (UB) in the presence of data races, and `memcmp` is incorrect when the values of `a` and/or `b` are modified concurrently (data race). This UB may manifest itself as a SIGSEGV. That being said, if we can allow the idiomatic use cases, like those in yottadb with opportunistic concurrency control (OCC), to execute without a SIGSEGV, at no cost to regular use cases, then we can aim to minimize harm to those existing users. The fix replaces a 32-bit `addl %edx, %eax` with the 64-bit variant `addq %rdx, %rax`. The 1-extra byte of code size from using the 64-bit instruction doesn't contribute to overall code size as the next target is aligned and has multiple bytes of `nop` padding before it. As well all the logic between the add and `ret` still fits in the same fetch block, so the cost of this change is basically zero. The relevant sequential logic can be seen in the following pseudo-code: ``` /* * rsi = a * rdi = b * rdx = len - 32 */ /* cmp a[0:15] and b[0:15]. Since length is known to be [17, 32] in this case, this check is also assumed to cover a[0:(31 - len)] and b[0:(31 - len)]. */ movups (%rsi), %xmm0 movups (%rdi), %xmm1 PCMPEQ %xmm0, %xmm1 pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax subl %ecx, %eax jnz L(END_NEQ) /* cmp a[len-16:len-1] and b[len-16:len-1]. */ movups 16(%rsi, %rdx), %xmm0 movups 16(%rdi, %rdx), %xmm1 PCMPEQ %xmm0, %xmm1 pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax subl %ecx, %eax jnz L(END_NEQ2) ret L(END2): /* Position first mismatch. */ bsfl %eax, %eax /* The sequential version is able to assume this value is a positive 32-bit value because the first check included bytes in range a[0:(31 - len)] and b[0:(31 - len)] so `eax` must be greater than `31 - len` so the minimum value of `edx` + `eax` is `(len - 32) + (32 - len) >= 0`. In the concurrent case, however, `a` or `b` could have been changed so a mismatch in `eax` less or equal than `(31 - len)` is possible (the new low bound is `(16 - len)`. This can result in a negative 32-bit signed integer, which when zero extended to 64-bits is a random large value this out out of bounds. */ addl %edx, %eax /* Crash here because 32-bit negative number in `eax` zero extends to out of bounds 64-bit offset. */ movzbl 16(%rdi, %rax), %ecx movzbl 16(%rsi, %rax), %eax ``` This fix is quite simple, just make the `addl %edx, %eax` 64 bit (i.e `addq %rdx, %rax`). This prevents the 32-bit zero extension and since `eax` is still a low bound of `16 - len` the `rdx + rax` is bound by `(len - 32) - (16 - len) >= -16`. Since we have a fixed offset of `16` in the memory access this must be in bounds.
Diffstat (limited to 'sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-sysconf-iov_max.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions