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author | Will Newton <will.newton@linaro.org> | 2013-10-09 14:41:57 +0100 |
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committer | Will Newton <will.newton@linaro.org> | 2013-10-10 14:52:05 +0100 |
commit | 321e26847188300173a5dc0ca42c2ff7b9bf7a78 (patch) | |
tree | 24b26956b40116bf12a2c6414444b42a14ef243a /malloc/hooks.c | |
parent | 40fefba1b5b05d05a3a4b48796a1006db90d8f74 (diff) | |
download | glibc-321e26847188300173a5dc0ca42c2ff7b9bf7a78.tar.gz glibc-321e26847188300173a5dc0ca42c2ff7b9bf7a78.tar.xz glibc-321e26847188300173a5dc0ca42c2ff7b9bf7a78.zip |
malloc/hooks.c: Correct check for overflow in memalign_check.
A large value of bytes passed to memalign_check can cause an integer overflow in _int_memalign and heap corruption. This issue can be exposed by running tst-memalign with MALLOC_CHECK_=3. ChangeLog: 2013-10-10 Will Newton <will.newton@linaro.org> * malloc/hooks.c (memalign_check): Ensure the value of bytes passed to _int_memalign does not overflow.
Diffstat (limited to 'malloc/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r-- | malloc/hooks.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/malloc/hooks.c b/malloc/hooks.c index 8c25846330..3f663bb6b2 100644 --- a/malloc/hooks.c +++ b/malloc/hooks.c @@ -361,10 +361,13 @@ memalign_check(size_t alignment, size_t bytes, const void *caller) if (alignment <= MALLOC_ALIGNMENT) return malloc_check(bytes, NULL); if (alignment < MINSIZE) alignment = MINSIZE; - if (bytes+1 == 0) { - __set_errno (ENOMEM); - return NULL; - } + /* Check for overflow. */ + if (bytes > SIZE_MAX - alignment - MINSIZE) + { + __set_errno (ENOMEM); + return 0; + } + (void)mutex_lock(&main_arena.mutex); mem = (top_check() >= 0) ? _int_memalign(&main_arena, alignment, bytes+1) : NULL; |