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| author | Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> | 1998-04-21 18:15:51 +0000 |
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| committer | Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> | 1998-04-21 18:15:51 +0000 |
| commit | 5aa8ff620ef68811c5a7dd5d5bbac1c078730a2a (patch) | |
| tree | efd66893a0690109dc0898541cfa6d41b0bf5029 /iconvdata/testdata/suntzus | |
| parent | 26e119f15e82aa334ad96f74513c4534daf4d35d (diff) | |
| download | glibc-5aa8ff620ef68811c5a7dd5d5bbac1c078730a2a.tar.gz glibc-5aa8ff620ef68811c5a7dd5d5bbac1c078730a2a.tar.xz glibc-5aa8ff620ef68811c5a7dd5d5bbac1c078730a2a.zip | |
Update.
1998-04-21 18:00 Ulrich Drepper <drepper@cygnus.com> * iconv/gconv.c (__gconv): Remove bogus input buffer size computation. * iconv/gconv_open.c (__gconv_open): Initialize outbufend element. * iconv/gconv_simple.c (__gconv_transform_internal_ascii): Don't use character in comparison with uint32_t. (__gconv_transform_internal_utf8): Specify MAX_NEEDED_TO. (__gconv_transform_utf8_internal): Specify MAX_NEEDED_FROM. Optimize BODY a bit. * iconv/loop.c: Require MIN_NEEDED_INPUT and MIN_NEEDED_OUTPUT to be defined. * iconv/skeleton.c: Also reset converted counter in case of an error. Call reset function using correct value for output buffer start. * iconvdata/Makefile: Re-enable tests. * iconvdata/iso8859-1.c: Swap MIN_NEEDED_INPUT and MIN_NEEDED_OUTPUT value for to-conversion. * iconvdata/TESTS: Add new third column. * iconvdata/run-iconv-test.sh: Add support for charsets which are not ASCII based. * iconvdata/testdata/suntzus: New file. * elf/dl-minimal.c (__strtol_internal): Increment pointer to string while reading. Correctly used base. Little optimization. (__strtoul_internal): Likewise. * elf/rtld.c (dl_main): Test to avoid duplicate call of _dl_init_paths was wrong. Use explicit variable. 1998-04-20 23:49 Zack Weinberg <zack@rabi.phys.columbia.edu> * configure.in: Check for awk. * config.make.in: Add AWK to be substituted. * manual/xtract-typefun.awk: Rewrite to eliminate gawk extensions. * manual/users.texi: Fix typo exposed by above rewrite. * Makefile: Invoke awk using AWK variable. * csu/Makefile: Likewise. * elf/Makefile: Likewise. * mach/Makefile: Likewise. * manual/Makefile: Likewise. * sysdeps/gnu/Makefile: Likewise. * sysdeps/mach/hurd/Makefile: Likewise. * sysdeps/unix/Makefile: Likewise. * timezone/Makefile: Likewise. 1998-04-10 Gordon Matzigkeit <gord@profitpress.com> * sysdeps/gnu/errlist.awk (ERR_REMAP): Implement error code to array index translation. (SYS_ERRLIST_ALIAS, SYS_NERR_ALIAS): Make weak aliases only if these are defined. * sysdeps/mach/hurd/Dist: Add errlist.c to distribution. * sysdeps/mach/hurd/errlist.c: New file. (ERR_TRANSLATE): Map Hurd error codes into errlist indices. (_hurd_errlist): The Hurd error list doesn't have Unix sys_errlist semantics, so rename it. 1998-04-16 Andreas Schwab <schwab@issan.informatik.uni-dortmund.de> * iconvdata/run-iconv-test.sh: Make portable. Always test all conversions. 1998-04-21 12:30 H.J. Lu <hjl@gnu.org> * wcsmbs/wcsrtombs.c (__wcsrtombs): Initialize result to 0. * wcsmbs/wcsnrtombs.c: Likewise. 1998-04-21 Ulrich Drepper <drepper@cygnus.com> * sysdeps/generic/dl-sysdep.c: Handle _dl_hwcap correctly. * wcsmbs/btowc.c (__btowc): Declare inptr as const char *. * time/strftime.c (my_strftime): Initialize pad variable in declaration. * iconvdata/big5.c: Don't use character constants in comparisons with unsigned value. * sysdeps/generic/setutxent.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/getutxent.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/endutxent.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/getutxid.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/getutxline.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/pututxline.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/utmpxname.c: New file. * sysdeps/generic/updwtmpx.c: New file.
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diff --git a/iconvdata/testdata/suntzus b/iconvdata/testdata/suntzus new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4432c05674 --- /dev/null +++ b/iconvdata/testdata/suntzus @@ -0,0 +1,1693 @@ + + + + + SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR + THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD + + Translated from the Chinese + By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910) + + + +[This is the basic text of Sun Tzu on the Art of War. It was +extracted from Mr. Giles' complete work as titled above. The +commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded +within it, has been released as suntzu10.txt (or suntzu10.zip). +This is being released only as an adjunct to that work, which +contains a wealth of commentary upon this text.] + + + + +I. LAYING PLANS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance + to the State. + + 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either + to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry + which can on no account be neglected. + + 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant + factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, + when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. + + 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; + (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. + +5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete + accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him + regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. + + 7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, + times and seasons. + + 8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; + danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; + the chances of life and death. + + 9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, + sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness. + +10. By method and discipline are to be understood + the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, + the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance + of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the + control of military expenditure. + +11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: + he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them + not will fail. + +12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking + to determine the military conditions, let them be made + the basis of a comparison, in this wise:-- + +13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued + with the Moral law? + (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? + (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven + and Earth? + (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? + (5) Which army is stronger? + (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? + (7) In which army is there the greater constancy + both in reward and punishment? + +14. By means of these seven considerations I can + forecast victory or defeat. + +15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts + upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! + The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, + will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed! + +16. While heading the profit of my counsel, + avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances + over and beyond the ordinary rules. + +17. According as circumstances are favorable, + one should modify one's plans. + +18. All warfare is based on deception. + +19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; + when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we + are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; + when far away, we must make him believe we are near. + +20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, + and crush him. + +21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. + If he is in superior strength, evade him. + +22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to + irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. + +23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. + If his forces are united, separate them. + +24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where + you are not expected. + +25. These military devices, leading to victory, + must not be divulged beforehand. + +26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many + calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. + The general who loses a battle makes but few + calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations + lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: + how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention + to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. + + +II. WAGING WAR + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, + where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, + as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand + mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them + a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, + including entertainment of guests, small items such as + glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, + will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. + Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. + + 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory + is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and + their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, + you will exhaust your strength. + 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources + of the State will not be equal to the strain. + + 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, + your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, + other chieftains will spring up to take advantage + of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, + will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. + + 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, + cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. + + 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited + from prolonged warfare. + + 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted + with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand + the profitable way of carrying it on. + + 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, + neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. + + 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage + on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough + for its needs. + +10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army + to be maintained by contributions from a distance. + Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes + the people to be impoverished. + +11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes + prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's + substance to be drained away. + +12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry + will be afflicted by heavy exactions. + +13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion + of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, + and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; + while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, + breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, + protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, + will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. + +15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging + on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions + is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise + a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty + from one's own store. + +16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must + be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from + defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. + +17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots + have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. + Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, + and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. + The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. + +18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment + one's own strength. + +19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, + not lengthy campaigns. + +20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies + is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it + depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril. + + +III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best + thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; + to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is + better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, + to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire + than to destroy them. + + 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles + is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists + in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. + + 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to + balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent + the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in + order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; + and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. + + 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it + can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, + movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take + up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over + against the walls will take three months more. + + 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, + will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, + with the result that one-third of his men are slain, + while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous + effects of a siege. + + 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's + troops without any fighting; he captures their cities + without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom + without lengthy operations in the field. + + 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery + of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph + will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem. + + 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten + to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, + to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army + into two. + + 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; + if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; + if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. + +10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made + by a small force, in the end it must be captured + by the larger force. + +11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; + if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will + be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will + be weak. + +12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring + misfortune upon his army:-- + +13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, + being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. + This is called hobbling the army. + +14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the + same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant + of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes + restlessness in the soldier's minds. + +15. (3) By employing the officers of his army + without discrimination, through ignorance of the + military principle of adaptation to circumstances. + This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. + +16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, + trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. + This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging + victory away. + +17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials + for victory: + (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when + not to fight. + (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior + and inferior forces. + (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same + spirit throughout all its ranks. + (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take + the enemy unprepared. + (5) He will win who has military capacity and is + not interfered with by the sovereign. + +18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy + and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a + hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, + for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. + If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will + succumb in every battle. + + +IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put + themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then + waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. + + 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our + own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy + is provided by the enemy himself. + 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, + but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. + + 4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer + without being able to do it. + + 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; + ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. + + 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient + strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. + + 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the + most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in + attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. + Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; + on the other, a victory that is complete. + + 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken + of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. + + 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight + and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" + +10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; + to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; + to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. + +11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is + one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. + +12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation + for wisdom nor credit for courage. + +13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. + Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty + of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is + already defeated. + +14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into + a position which makes defeat impossible, and does + not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. + +15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist + only seeks battle after the victory has been won, + whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights + and afterwards looks for victory. + +16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, + and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is + in his power to control success. + +17. In respect of military method, we have, + firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; + thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; + fifthly, Victory. + +18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; + Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to + Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; + and Victory to Balancing of chances. + +19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as + a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. + +20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting + of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. + + +V. ENERGY + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force + is the same principle as the control of a few men: + it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. + + 2. Fighting with a large army under your command + is nowise different from fighting with a small one: + it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. + + 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand + the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- + this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. + + 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone + dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science + of weak points and strong. + + 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used + for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed + in order to secure victory. + + 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible + as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; + like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; + like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. + + 7. There are not more than five musical notes, + yet the combinations of these five give rise to more + melodies than can ever be heard. + + 8. There are not more than five primary colors + (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination + they produce more hues than can ever been seen. + + 9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes + (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations + of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. + +10. In battle, there are not more than two methods + of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two + in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. + +11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. + It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. + Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination? + +12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent + which will even roll stones along in its course. + +13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed + swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy + its victim. + +14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible + in his onset, and prompt in his decision. + +15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; + decision, to the releasing of a trigger. + +16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may + be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; + amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head + or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. + +17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, + simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness + postulates strength. + +18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is + simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under + a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; + masking strength with weakness is to be effected + by tactical dispositions. + +19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy + on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to + which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, + that the enemy may snatch at it. + +20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; + then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. + +21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined + energy, and does not require too much from individuals. + Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize + combined energy. + +22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting + men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. + For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain + motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; + if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if + round-shaped, to go rolling down. + +23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men + is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain + thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject + of energy. + + +VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and + awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; + whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle + will arrive exhausted. + + 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on + the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. + + 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy + to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, + he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. + + 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; + if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; + if quietly encamped, he can force him to move. + + 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; + march swiftly to places where you are not expected. + + 6. An army may march great distances without distress, + if it marches through country where the enemy is not. + + 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks + if you only attack places which are undefended.You can + ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold + positions that cannot be attacked. + + 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose + opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful + in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. + + 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you + we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; + and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. + +10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, + if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire + and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid + than those of the enemy. + +11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced + to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high + rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack + some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. + +12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent + the enemy from engaging us even though the lines + of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. + All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable + in his way. + +13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining + invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, + while the enemy's must be divided. + +14. We can form a single united body, while the + enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will + be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, + which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few. + +15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force + with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. + +16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be + made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare + against a possible attack at several different points; + and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, + the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will + be proportionately few. + +17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, + he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, + he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, + he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, + he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, + he will everywhere be weak. + +18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare + against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling + our adversary to make these preparations against us. + +19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, + we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order + to fight. + +20. But if neither time nor place be known, + then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, + the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van + unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. + How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are + anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest + are separated by several LI! + +21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers + of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage + them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then + that victory can be achieved. + +22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may + prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover + his plans and the likelihood of their success. + +23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his + activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, + so as to find out his vulnerable spots. + +24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, + so that you may know where strength is superabundant + and where it is deficient. + +25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch + you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, + and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, + from the machinations of the wisest brains. + +26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's + own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. + +27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, + but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory + is evolved. + +28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained + you one victory, but let your methods be regulated + by the infinite variety of circumstances. + +29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its + natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. + +30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong + and to strike at what is weak. + +31. Water shapes its course according to the nature + of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works + out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. + +32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, + so in warfare there are no constant conditions. + +33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his + opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called + a heaven-born captain. + +34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) + are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make + way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; + the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. + + +VII. MANEUVERING + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his + commands from the sovereign. + + 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, + he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof + before pitching his camp. + + 3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, + than which there is nothing more difficult. + The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists + in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. + + 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, + after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting + after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, + shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION. + + 5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; + with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. + + 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order + to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be + too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column + for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage + and stores. + + 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their + buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day + or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, + doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, + the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into + the hands of the enemy. + + 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded + ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth + of your army will reach its destination. + + 9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver + the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, + and only half your force will reach the goal. + +10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, + two-thirds of your army will arrive. + +11. We may take it then that an army without its + baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; + without bases of supply it is lost. + +12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are + acquainted with the designs of our neighbors. + +13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march + unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its + mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, + its marshes and swamps. + +14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage + to account unless we make use of local guides. + +15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. + +16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, + must be decided by circumstances. + +17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, + your compactness that of the forest. + +18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, + is immovability like a mountain. + +19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, + and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. + +20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be + divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, + cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. + +21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move. + +22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice + of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering. + +23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field + of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: + hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary + objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution + of banners and flags. + +24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means + whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused + on one particular point. + +25. The host thus forming a single united body, + is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, + or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art + of handling large masses of men. + +26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires + and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, + as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army. + +27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; + a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. + +28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; + by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, + his mind is bent only on returning to camp. + +29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when + its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish + and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. + +30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance + of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art + of retaining self-possession. + +31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still + far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is + toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy + is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength. + +32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose + banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking + an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this + is the art of studying circumstances. + +33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill + against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. + +34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; + do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. + +35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. + Do not interfere with an army that is returning home. + +36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. + Do not press a desperate foe too hard. + +37. Such is the art of warfare. + + +VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives + his commands from the sovereign, collects his army + and concentrates his forces + + 2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country + where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. + Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. + In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. + In desperate position, you must fight. + + 3. There are roads which must not be followed, + armies which must be not attacked, towns which must + be besieged, positions which must not be contested, + commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. + + 4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages + that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle + his troops. + + 5. The general who does not understand these, may be well + acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he + will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. + + 6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art + of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted + with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use + of his men. + + 7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of + advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. + + 8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in + this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential + part of our schemes. + + 9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties + we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate + ourselves from misfortune. + +10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage + on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them + constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, + and make them rush to any given point. + +11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the + likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness + to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, + but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. + +12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect + a general: + (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction; + (2) cowardice, which leads to capture; + (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; + (4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; + (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him + to worry and trouble. + +13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, + ruinous to the conduct of war. + +14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, + the cause will surely be found among these five + dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation. + + +IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of + encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. + Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood + of valleys. + + 2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb + heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare. + + 3. After crossing a river, you should get far away + from it. + + 4. When an invading force crosses a river in its + onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. + It will be best to let half the army get across, + and then deliver your attack. + + 5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go + to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. + + 6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing + the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. + So much for river warfare. + + 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern + should be to get over them quickly, without any delay. + + 8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should + have water and grass near you, and get your back + to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marches. + + 9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible + position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, + so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. + So much for campaigning in flat country. + +10. These are the four useful branches of military + knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish + four several sovereigns. + +11. All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny + places to dark. + +12. If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard + ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, + and this will spell victory. + +13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the + sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. + Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers + and utilize the natural advantages of the ground. + +14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, + a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked + with foam, you must wait until it subsides. + +15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs + with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, + confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, + should be left with all possible speed and not approached. + +16. While we keep away from such places, we should + get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, + we should let the enemy have them on his rear. + +17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should + be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, + hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick + undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; + for these are places where men in ambush or insidious + spies are likely to be lurking. + +18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, + he is relying on the natural strength of his position. + +19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, + he is anxious for the other side to advance. + +20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, + he is tendering a bait. + +21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the + enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens + in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. + +22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign + of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden + attack is coming. + +23. When there is dust rising in a high column, + it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, + but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach + of infantry. When it branches out in different directions, + it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. + A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army + is encamping. + +24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs + that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language + and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he + will retreat. + +25. When the light chariots come out first and take + up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy + is forming for battle. + +26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant + indicate a plot. + +27. When there is much running about and the soldiers + fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. + +28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, + it is a lure. + +29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, + they are faint from want of food. + +30. If those who are sent to draw water begin + by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. + +31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and + makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. + +32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. + Clamor by night betokens nervousness. + +33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's + authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted + about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, + it means that the men are weary. + +34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills + its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their + cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they + will not return to their tents, you may know that they + are determined to fight to the death. + +35. The sight of men whispering together in small + knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection + amongst the rank and file. + +36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is + at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray + a condition of dire distress. + +37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright + at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. + +38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, + it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. + +39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain + facing ours for a long time without either joining + battle or taking themselves off again, the situation + is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. + +40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, + that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack + can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all + our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, + and obtain reinforcements. + +41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light + of his opponents is sure to be captured by them. + +42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown + attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, + unless submissive, then will be practically useless. + If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, + punishments are not enforced, they will still be unless. + +43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first + instance with humanity, but kept under control by means + of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. + +44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually + enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, + its discipline will be bad. + +45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always + insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual. + + +X. TERRAIN + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, + to wit: (1) Accessible ground; (2) entangling ground; + (3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous + heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy. + + 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides + is called accessible. + + 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before + the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, + and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you + will be able to fight with advantage. + + 4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard + to re-occupy is called entangling. + + 5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy + is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. + But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you + fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, + disaster will ensue. + + 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain + by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground. + + 7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy + should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable + not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing + the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has + come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. + + 8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy + them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await + the advent of the enemy. + + 9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, + do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, + but only if it is weakly garrisoned. + +10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are + beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the + raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. + +11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, + do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away. + +12. If you are situated at a great distance from + the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, + it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be + to your disadvantage. + +13. These six are the principles connected with Earth. + The general who has attained a responsible post must be + careful to study them. + +14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, + not arising from natural causes, but from faults + for which the general is responsible. These are: + (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; + (5) disorganization; (6) rout. + +15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is + hurled against another ten times its size, the result + will be the flight of the former. + +16. When the common soldiers are too strong and + their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. + When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers + too weak, the result is collapse. + +17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, + and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account + from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief + can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, + the result is ruin. + +18. When the general is weak and without authority; + when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there + are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, + and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, + the result is utter disorganization. + +19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's + strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, + or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, + and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, + the result must be rout. + +20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must + be carefully noted by the general who has attained + a responsible post. + +21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's + best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, + of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly + calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, + constitutes the test of a great general. + +22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts + his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. + He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely + be defeated. + +23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, + then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; + if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not + fight even at the ruler's bidding. + +24. The general who advances without coveting fame + and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only + thought is to protect his country and do good service + for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. + +25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they + will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them + as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you + even unto death. + +26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make + your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce + your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: + then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; + they are useless for any practical purpose. + +27. If we know that our own men are in a condition + to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open + to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. + +28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, + but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition + to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. + +29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, + and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, + but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes + fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway + towards victory. + +30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, + is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never + at a loss. + +31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and + know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; + if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your + victory complete. + + +XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: + (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; + (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; + (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; + (9) desperate ground. + + 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, + it is dispersive ground. + + 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, + but to no great distance, it is facile ground. + + 4. Ground the possession of which imports great + advantage to either side, is contentious ground. + + 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement + is open ground. + + 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, + so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire + at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways. + + 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a + hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities + in its rear, it is serious ground. + + 8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all + country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground. + + 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, + and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, + so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush + a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. + +10. Ground on which we can only be saved from + destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground. + +11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. + On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, + attack not. + +12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. + On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands + with your allies. + +13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. + In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. + +14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. + On desperate ground, fight. + +15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew + how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear; + to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; + to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, + the officers from rallying their men. + +16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed + to keep them in disorder. + +17. When it was to their advantage, they made + a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still. + +18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy + in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, + I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your + opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." + +19. Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of + the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, + and attack unguarded spots. + +20. The following are the principles to be observed + by an invading force: The further you penetrate into + a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, + and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. + +21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply + your army with food. + +22. Carefully study the well-being of your men, + and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard + your strength. Keep your army continually on the move, + and devise unfathomable plans. + +23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there + is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. + If they will face death, there is nothing they may + not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth + their uttermost strength. + +24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose + the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, + they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, + they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help + for it, they will fight hard. + +25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers + will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to + be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, + they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can + be trusted. + +26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with + superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, + no calamity need be feared. + +27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, + it is not because they have a distaste for riches; + if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they + are disinclined to longevity. + +28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, + your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing + their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run + down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay, + and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei. + +29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the + shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found + in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you + will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you + will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, + and you will be attacked by head and tail both. + +30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, + I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men + of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river + in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come + to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. + +31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust + in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot + wheels in the ground + +32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set + up one standard of courage which all must reach. + +33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that + is a question involving the proper use of ground. + +34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just + as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by + the hand. + +35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus + ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. + +36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men + by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them + in total ignorance. + +37. By altering his arrangements and changing + his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. + By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, + he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose. + +38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army + acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks + away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep + into hostile territory before he shows his hand. + +39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; + like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives + his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he + is going. + +40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this + may be termed the business of the general. + +41. The different measures suited to the nine + varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or + defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: + these are things that must most certainly be studied. + +42. When invading hostile territory, the general + principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; + penetrating but a short way means dispersion. + +43. When you leave your own country behind, and take + your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself + on critical ground. When there are means of communication + on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. + +44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is + serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, + it is facile ground. + +45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, + and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. + When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. + +46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire + my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would + see that there is close connection between all parts + of my army. + +47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear. + +48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye + on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, + I would consolidate my alliances. + +49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure + a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult ground, + I would keep pushing on along the road. + +50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way + of retreat. On desperate ground, I would proclaim + to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives. + +51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer + an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard + when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he + has fallen into danger. + +52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring + princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are + not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar + with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, + its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. + We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account + unless we make use of local guides. + +53. To be ignored of any one of the following four + or five principles does not befit a warlike prince. + +54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, + his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration + of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, + and their allies are prevented from joining against him. + +55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all + and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. + He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his + antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their + cities and overthrow their kingdoms. + +56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, + issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; + and you will be able to handle a whole army as though + you had to do with but a single man. + +57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; + never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright, + bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when + the situation is gloomy. + +58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; + plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off + in safety. + +59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into + harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. + +60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully + accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose. + +61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall + succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief. + +62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing + by sheer cunning. + +63. On the day that you take up your command, + block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, + and stop the passage of all emissaries. + +64. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you + may control the situation. + +65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. + +66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, + and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. + +67. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate + yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. + +68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, + until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate + the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late + for the enemy to oppose you. + + +XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking + with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; + the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn + baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; + the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. + + 2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have + means available. The material for raising fire should + always be kept in readiness. + + 3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, + and special days for starting a conflagration. + + 4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; + the special days are those when the moon is in the + constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing + or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind. + + 5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared + to meet five possible developments: + + 6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, + respond at once with an attack from without. + + 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's + soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack. + + 8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, + follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; + if not, stay where you are. + + 9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire + from without, do not wait for it to break out within, + but deliver your attack at a favorable moment. + +10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. + Do not attack from the leeward. + +11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, + but a night breeze soon falls. + +12. In every army, the five developments connected with + fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, + and a watch kept for the proper days. + +13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; + those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. + +14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, + but not robbed of all his belongings. + +15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his + battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating + the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time + and general stagnation. + +16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his + plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. + +17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not + your troops unless there is something to be gained; + fight not unless the position is critical. + +18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely + to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight + a battle simply out of pique. + +19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; + if not, stay where you are. + +20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may + be succeeded by content. + +21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can + never come again into being; nor can the dead ever + be brought back to life. + +22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, + and the good general full of caution. This is the way + to keep a country at peace and an army intact. + + +XIII. THE USE OF SPIES + + + 1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand + men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss + on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. + The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces + of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, + and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. + As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded + in their labor. + + 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, + striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. + This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's + condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred + ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height + of inhumanity. + + 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present + help to his sovereign, no master of victory. + + 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good + general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond + the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. + + 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; + it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, + nor by any deductive calculation. + + 6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only + be obtained from other men. + + 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: + (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; + (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. + + 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, + none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine + manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's + most precious faculty. + + 9. Having local spies means employing the services + of the inhabitants of a district. + +10. Having inward spies, making use of officials + of the enemy. + +11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's + spies and using them for our own purposes. + +12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly + for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know + of them and report them to the enemy. + +13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring + back news from the enemy's camp. + +14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are + more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. + None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other + business should greater secrecy be preserved. + +15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain + intuitive sagacity. + +16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence + and straightforwardness. + +17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make + certain of the truth of their reports. + +18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every + kind of business. + +19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy + before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together + with the man to whom the secret was told. + +20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm + a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always + necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, + the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general + in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. + +21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us + must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and + comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted + spies and available for our service. + +22. It is through the information brought by the + converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ + local and inward spies. + +23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can + cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. + +24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving + spy can be used on appointed occasions. + +25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties + is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only + be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. + Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated + with the utmost liberality. + +26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I + Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise + of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served + under the Yin. + +27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the + wise general who will use the highest intelligence of + the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve + great results. Spies are a most important element in water, + because on them depends an army's ability to move. + + |